Cary Wolfe, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003)

Sloughing the Human

Steve Baker

One explanation for the continuing attraction of the animal for artists, philosophers, and others is the perception—which may or may not be justified—that the very idea of the animal is in some way aligned with creativity, or in alliance with creativity. What is it to be animal? What does it take, what is sufficient, to suggest or to gesture toward the other-than-human? This is a matter not of extravagance but of sobriety—a matter of judging just what it takes to step aside from the human, to indicate an other, to signal the animal, and thus to enter that privileged "experimental" state of identity-suspension that has so concisely and contentiously been named becoming-animal, *devenir-animal*.[1]

What Does It Take to Be an Animal?

Opportunities to take on the guise of the animal are eagerly grasped. In the 1990s, the artist Jordan Baseman taught himself taxidermy in order to make a number of striking pieces that often use the skins of domestic animals discovered as roadkill outside his studio in east London. The finished pieces occupy an uneasy middle ground somewhere between sculpture and conventional taxidermy; Baseman himself thinks of them as "empty trophies." One such piece, titled *Be Your Dog*, is essentially a headdress made from a scalped pair of Alsatian's ears (Figure 1). It has only been exhibited once, mounted approximately at head height on the wall of



Figure 1. Jordan Baseman, *Be Your Dog*, 1997. Dog's ears, plastic. Photograph copyright Jordan Baseman.

a gallery in Austria. Although never intended to be worn, Baseman found to his surprise that visitors to the gallery eagerly aligned themselves with the piece, their backs to the wall, in order to have themselves photographed appearing to "wear" the ears and to think themselves into this new state of being, just as the title suggests. As the artist acknowledges, "it's about desire, frustrated desire, more than anything else, because there is a strong desire to wear it. It might sicken you, but you do feel compelled to put the damn thing on."[2]

This particular headdress—being made from the skin of a real animal—is no mere representation, but in all other respects it is not so different from the souvenir Mickey Mouse ear sets sold to be worn by visitors to Disneyland, which in other circumstances have served as a sufficient sign of animality (of dressing up as an animal, that is to say) that they have been worn by American animal rights protesters seeking to alert the public to the fate of laboratory mice subjected to cosmetics testing (Figure 2). The frequent adoption of such guises in the cause of animal rights calls for a study in itself, but there too the connection is sometimes made between animal identity and creativity. Brian Luke, for example, specifically views animal liberation "as creative, not restrictive. It extends possibilities for action." The term he proposes for the adoption of these new possibilities is *going feral*—a state in which humans

Figure 2. "Fried to death" protest, circa 1990. Animal Rights Advocates of the Hudson Valley, Beacon, New York.

put themselves into "the position of feral animals, formerly domesticated but now occupying a semiwild state on the boundaries of hierarchical civilization."[3]

Such possibilities, which appear more open-ended in terms of how they see the boundaries of the human and the nonhuman animal, and the scope for some kind of *exchange* across those boundaries, have also been of interest to artists and philosophers. Their various approaches to the question of what it is to be animal tend to complicate the roles of various parts of the performing body in any taking on of animality.

The Hands of Beuys and Heidegger

When, in 1974, Joseph Beuys staged his weeklong performance *Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me* in the René Block Gallery in New York, the spectacle presented to viewers through the chain-link barrier separating them from the main space of the gallery was that of the artist and a live coyote ("Little John") playing out a mainly improvised encounter as the week progressed (Figure 3). In this confrontation of human and animal, Beuys suggested, "the roles were exchanged immediately." Although initially structured by a cycle of ritualized actions, Beuys was acting out the limits of his own control of the situation, with the coyote figuring for him as "an important cooperator in the production of

Figure 3. Joseph Beuys, *Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me*, 1974. Photograph copyright DACS 2001.

freedom." The animal enabled the artist to edge closer to that which "the human being cannot understand."[4]

In fact, however, it is the manner in which Beuys established his humanness that is especially revealing. In a space strewn with straw, lengths of felt, ripped copies of the *Wall Street Journal*, and a variety of other materials the artist had brought along, a pair of gloves (which he had painted brown and which were repeatedly thrown to the coyote) are worthy of particular note. Their color represented "the will to sculptural form," and their form was that of his own hands. Beuys explained:

> The brown gloves represent my hands, and the freedom of movement that human beings possess with their hands. They have the freedom to do the widest range of things, to utilise any number of tools and instruments. They can wield a hammer or cut with a knife. They can write or mould forms. Hands are universal, and this is the significance of the human hand. . . . They are not restricted to one specific use like the talons of an eagle or the mole's diggers. So the throwing of the gloves to Little John meant giving him my hands to play with. (Tisdall, *Joseph Beuys*, 28, 29–30)

The artist gives something to the animal, and what he chooses to give is his hands. They carry associations of creativity ("the will to sculptural form") and they enable the animal to play. They are, in a sense, the opposite of Baseman's dog headdress. They are just sufficient to gesture toward the other-than-animal: the human.

This would be of no great interest were it not for the fact that Beuys's position so closely echoes that of the philosopher Martin Heidegger in his 1947 "Letter on Humanism." Heidegger had periodically addressed the relation of humans and other animals, sometimes at great length, since the late 1920s. His initial theses, framed as a means of assessing how it was possible to know or to have access to the experience of the world, ran as follows:

1. The stone is worldless.
2. The animal is poor in world.
3. Man is world-forming.

They were intended as no more than provisional and exploratory tools. Disparaging as the term "poor in world" *(weltarm)* may sound, it was the fact that Heidegger could use it while explicitly acknowledging the great "discriminatory capacity of a falcon's eye" or of "the canine sense of smell"—and while arguing that "amoebae and infusoria" were

no less perfect and complete than "elephants or apes"—that led him repeatedly to insist that poverty in world "must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation."[5]

These writings have been dissected in considerable detail by Jacques Derrida, who by the 1990s had become increasingly concerned with philosophy's (and thus humanity's) responsibilities toward animals. Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism"—which explores the question of the "abyss" separating humans from other animals more briefly and more dogmatically than his earlier writings—contains what Derrida regards as Heidegger's most "seriously dogmatic" sentence: "Apes, for example, have organs that can grasp, but they have no hand."[6]

In a fascinating exploration of exactly what the hand meant to Heidegger (which includes an all too brief reference to "the play and the theatre of hands" in extant photographs of the philosopher), Derrida shows that a number of far from obvious associations clustered around Heidegger's conception of the human hand, marking it out as utterly other than the animal's paws, claws, or talons. For one thing, this hand has a complex relation to thought:

> If there is a thought of the hand or a hand of thought, as Heidegger gives us to think, it is not of the order of conceptual grasping. Rather this thought of the hand belongs to the essence of the *gift*, of a giving that would give, if this is possible, without taking hold of anything. If the hand is also, no one can deny this, an organ for gripping, that . . . is not the hand's essence in the human being. ("*Geschlecht* II," 169, 172–73).

This amounts, Derrida notes, to an "assured opposition of *giving* and *taking*: man's hand *gives and gives itself* . . . like thought or what gives itself to be thought . . . whereas the organ of the ape . . . can only *take hold of, grasp, lay hands on the thing*" (175).

This is indeed an impoverished notion of the animal. Put alongside the earlier thesis that only humans are "world-forming," it leaves the animal gazing across the abyss not only at all that is human, but also at all that is associated with thought, generosity, and creativity. In terms of the widespread cultural fascination with the animal, this seems wrong. Although animals, including the great apes, are still widely regarded and treated as being lower down on some notional phylogenetic hierarchy than are humans, their value to the human imagination has seldom been in doubt.

It is for these reasons that it seems so odd to find Beuys generously (or, more accurately, condescendingly) offering the coyote his own crea-

tivity, in the form of the painted brown gloves, when the continuing power and fascination of that whole weeklong exchange between them—already more than a quarter of a century ago—lies in the idea of the artist slowly giving up preconceptions and learning something of what the animal has to offer him.

This tension, this awkwardness, may nevertheless be in keeping with Beuys's role as a performer rather than a philosopher. Philosophy has all too often tried to settle matters (on the question of animals as much as on any other), whereas art has more often seen the scope for unsettling things. Derrida admittedly notes what he calls the "precariousness" of Heidegger's opposition of "the gift and the grip" (176), but it may well be that artists are in a better position to demonstrate and to *act out* that precariousness. And where Derrida states that, for Heidegger, "a hand can never upsurge out of a paw or claws" (178), there is no shortage of art that finds both this and its opposite—paws and claws upsurging out of hands—to be a source of fascination, anxiety, and delight.

Art's Animal Hands

For many contemporary artists, the animal stands in as a new form of being, a creative postmodern being, and it emphatically does have hands.[7] Examples abound. A 1997 video performance by Edwina Ashton, titled *Sheep*, is seen on two adjacent video screens. On the right, a figure dressed as a sheep looks across, as it were, to the other screen, on which an apparently identically dressed figure, in much the same domestic setting, sits at a desk with its script (Figure 4). In a faltering voice, this second sheep recites a series of appalling sheep jokes: "Why do sheep hate pens? Because they can't write"; "Can you stop making that noise with the paper? Why? Because I hate sheep rustlers"; and so on.

Both performers are Ashton herself, but with her voice disguised: "I don't want to be in them," she has said of all her video performances. A long time was spent "trying to get the faces right" on the handmade costumes, to achieve "a sufficient degree of blankness," while nevertheless creating for the animal what she calls a kind of "haphazard" look. Strangely, even on repeated viewings, this characterless sheep is entirely believable. Stuck inside the thing, and telling bad jokes at the expense of the animal identity she has taken on, she physically tugs the features of its makeshift face back and forth. It is the hands, more than anything, that tell of this problematized and uncomfortable identity: when they are not at her face, she is endlessly, agitatedly wringing them throughout the four-minute duration of the piece.

Figure 4. Edwina Ashton, video still from *Sheep*, 1997. Photograph courtesy of the artist.

Aside from Ashton's *Sheep*, it has generally been the hands of primates to which artists have been so keen to attend. The handedness of John Isaacs's 1995 *Untitled (Monkey)* is especially striking (Figure 5). The chimpanzee's hands and "feet" were cast from the hands of the five-year-old son of one of the artist's friends: "The hands are really badly grafted on—there's no attempt to pretend that they're part of the same animal." The realism of the piece, which is more like a waxwork or mannequin than a sculpture, makes this aberrant creation (whose body is both ravaged and delicate) particularly disturbing.

This piece crops up, uncredited but unmistakable, in Will Self's 1997 novel *Great Apes*. The book's central character, the artist Simon Dykes, wakes one morning, after a night of especially heavy recreational drug abuse, to find that he has turned into a chimpanzee, as have all other inhabitants of his previously human world. Toward the end of the novel, at a chimp-packed exhibition opening in the Saatchi Gallery (the place where Isaacs's sculptures had in fact been displayed a year earlier), Dykes comes across a display of "various chimpikins," the strangest of which "was covered with a most inhuman coat of patchy fur, and had hind paws with prehensile digits, one of which it was using to give itself an interminable mainline fix." As Dykes perceptively remarks of these thinly

primatomorphized versions of Isaacs's mannequin-like works, "these chimpikins are alluding to some crucial loss of perspective, occasioned by the enforcement of a hard dividing line between chimp and beast."[8]

Art's uncomfortable erasure of such dividing lines is evident in the photographer Robin Schwartz's series of "primate portraits," especially



Figure 5. John Isaacs, *Untitled (Monkey)*, 1995. Mixed media. Arts Council Collection: Photography, Hayward Gallery, London. Gift of Charles Saatchi, 1999. Photograph copyright Stephen White. Reprinted with permission of the artist.

the 1988 photograph *Ping* (Figure 6), which shows a female capuchin looking remarkably at ease on a sofa, one arm draped casually across a cushion, and surrounded by cuddly toy animals from which at first glance it is not easy to distinguish the monkey. On further inspection, something about the pose of the animal recalls Barthes's comments on Robert Mapplethorpe's photograph *Young Man with Arm Extended*, about which he wrote: "the photographer has caught the boy's hand . . . at just the right degree of openness," so that it is "offered with benevolence."[9]

Paula Rego's vision of the animal as artist in *Red Monkey Drawing* and in *Monkeys Drawing Each Other* (Figure 7), both dating from 1981, reinforces more explicitly the necessary handedness of any conception of the animal as both creative and generous. How can the ape figure as an artist (as it does in so many postmodern imaginings) if it does not have a hand? The question is by no means entirely rhetorical. The living apes whose handiwork is recorded in Thierry Lenain's survey, *Monkey Painting*, bring Rego's image of the monkey painter (an old theme, in any case) to life. No matter that Lenain insists that the work of these creatures is not in fact "art" in any usual sense of that word. Many contemporary artists, Isaacs included, are keen to distance themselves from just the kind of activities and objects traditionally understood to be art.

Figure 6. Robin Schwartz, *Ping: Capuchin, Female, 5 Years Old*, 1988. Gelatin silver print. Photograph copyright Robin Schwartz, 1997. Reprinted with permission of the photographer.



Figure 7. Paula Rego, *Monkeys Drawing Each Other,* 1981. Acrylic on paper. Photograph courtesy of the artist. Reprinted with permission of Marlborough Fine Art, London.

Lenain's emphasis on the fact that the apes' interest is only in the "pure disruptive play" of active image making, and not at all in "the product of their acts of deliberate disruption," may say more than he realizes about why the distinctly "handed," playful, and nonpossessive ape continues to serve as one rather useful model of the postmodern artist.[10] This is certainly how Hélène Cixous understands the responsibilities of artists: they are "those who create new values . . . inventors and wreckers of concepts and forms, those who change life."[11] In French these are *les désordonnantes,* the sowers of disorder, her neologism significantly incorporating the word *donnant(e)* (generous, open-handed), thus emphasizing the centrality of generosity to this account of creativity.

Imitating the Animal

Any assessment of what it takes to be an animal, or to be taken to be an animal, or to become animal (for this is always an active, acted-out process), cannot dodge the difficult question of imitation. It is Deleuze and Guattari who have made this question so difficult for the postmodern artist, for they rule it out as untenable and uncreative. "No art is imitative, no art can be imitative," they write, and "becoming animal does not consist in playing animal or imitating an animal" (304, 238).

Radical as their account of becoming-animal undoubtedly is (in terms of its exploration of both animality and creativity), a degree of unrecognized fixity underpins this apparently fluid concept. The refusal of imitation is one of the key strategies by which the authors try to clarify what they mean by becoming-animal. They propose: "We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself . . . not the supposedly fixed terms through which that becoming passes" (238). Nevertheless, they *warn against* imitation rather than suggest it to be an impossible undertaking. But to be able to imitate an animal (or, indeed, to refuse to do so) already presupposes a knowledge of what that animal *is.* Unlike philosophy, much contemporary art appears to find such knowledge uninteresting.

Whether or not they are done in the spirit of becoming, forms of what are most readily described as imitation seem central to art's exploration of the animal. In being both outlandish and preposterously transparent, however, they make no claims to the "nature" of the imitated animal. These imitations generally act out the instability rather than the fixity of the thing nominally imitated. They suggest playful exchanges between the human and the animal, or between one animal and another, which may allude to borders and distinctions but which are not impeded by them.

In William Wegman's 1970 photograph *Crow,* a stuffed parrot appears to cast the shadow of a crow. In many of Wegman's subsequent photographs of his famous pet Weimaraner, Man Ray, the dog imitates or is dressed as various other kinds of animal: leopard, zebra, bat, dinosaur, and so on. As the artist laconically puts it, "I like things that fluctuate."[12] The dressing up, rather as in Ashton's *Sheep,* is generally a halfhearted and haphazard affair. In *Elephant* (1981), Man Ray is given tusks and a trunk (which appears to be an oversized old stuffed sock), and sits in a domesticized "jungle" setting indicated by a single potted rubber plant. In *Frog/Frog II* (1982), the dog looks down at a frog, which it feebly imitates by wearing Ping-Pong ball eyes and green rubber flippers on its hind legs.

"Imitation" of an animal can be just that easy and approximate. Baseman's *Be Your Dog* is a positive invitation to the viewer to take on dogness merely by imitating one aspect of the animal's appearance. Paula Rego's 1994 *Dog Woman* series begins with a large pastel drawing in which the artist herself is seen "squatting down and snarling"; she suggests that "the physicality of the picture came from my turning myself into an animal in this way."[13] In Lucy Gunning's video *The Horse Impressionists,* four young women take turns to do their best impressions of the sound and move-

ments of horses. Their hands, significantly, are central to these imitations: either held up to indicate the horse's raised forelegs or cupped to the mouth to aid their impressions of the animal's neighing and whinnying. Aware of the preposterousness of these poor imitations, their attempts constantly break down into bursts of laughter.

It is not only artists and their viewers or collaborators who can establish the scope for creative expression in animal imitation, and its inseparability from what Deleuze and Guattari regard as a more thoroughgoing becoming-animal. A brief episode in a home video shows a colleague's young daughter running in circles at some speed around their living room shouting "I'm a bee I'm a bee I'm a bee" at the top of her voice—a compelling and entirely convincing instance of becoming-animal being achieved through conviction and repetition, with no need for dressing up.

In all these instances, it might be said that the thing imitated or gestured toward is not so much an animal as a version of the imitator or gesturer—"l'animal que donc je suis," as Derrida has it.[14] In a postmodern age marked by "a deeply felt loss of faith in our ability to represent the real,"[15] this is perhaps how the animal is now most productively and imaginatively thought in art—as a thing actively to be performed, rather than passively represented.

Such performances appear to necessitate the sloughing of preconceptions and of identities. John Isaacs's animal pieces have been called "anti-subjects,"[16] and Isaacs has himself proposed that for him "the animal plays the role of the nonspecific human," and is therefore necessarily a thing "without an identity." Edwina Ashton, similarly, takes pride in saying of the creatures in her own animal performances, such as *Sheep,* that "you couldn't psychoanalyze those patients, could you?" And although Jordan Baseman himself has no particular interest in the question of psychoanalysis, his manipulations of animal form have been praised for the fact that they operate "without the safety net of psychoanalysis."[17] Jacques Derrida, pursuing his own literary-philosophical variant on these new kinds of beings, puns *animaux* into *animots,* in order to describe an awkward, living word-thing that can only be defined negatively: "Ni une espèce, ni un genre, ni un individu" ("L'Animal," 292). In each of these cases, this is the animal as a thing that can only be thought actively, and that approaches that genuinely experimental state of becoming-animal where things "cease to be subjects to become events" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 262). Any such event is one in which, as Heidegger recognized many years before Deleuze and Guattari, the human devises a means of going along with the animal.

Going Along with the Animal

Flawed as his approach may have been, it should not be forgotten that Heidegger's concern was to understand the animal in its otherness, and to let that otherness be. This understanding was to be achieved, he proposed, through an imaginative transposition of the human into an animal. In this "self-transposition," "the other being is precisely supposed to remain *what* it is and *how* it is. Transposing oneself into this being means . . . being able to go along with the other being while remaining *other* with respect to it." It is a "going-along-with" undertaken for the sake of "directly learning how it is with this being" (*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 202–3). The notion of letting the animal's otherness be has links to those postmodern conceptions of the animal that try to avoid forcibly rendering it meaningful in human terms, thus reducing its otherness to sameness, and its wonder to familiarity.

Two examples suggest how this going-along-with can be acted out as an exchange, a handing-across, which pivots on the work of art itself. Both concern humans in alliance with living animals, "learning how it is" with those beings, as Heidegger puts it. Olly and Suzi, the British artists known for painting predators in their natural habitat at the closest possible quarters—whether it be white sharks underwater off the coast of Cape Town, cheetahs in Namibia (Figure 8), or anacondas in Venezuela—have an unusual working method. The two work simultaneously on each image, "hand over hand," as they put it, and wherever possible they also allow the depicted animals to "interact" with the work and mark it further themselves. This may take the form of bears or elephants leaving prints or urine stains on an image, or of chunks being bitten off by a wolf or a shark. Such interactions are extensively documented "as a performance" by the photographer Greg Williams, who travels with the artists.

It is the paintings themselves, once marked by the animal, that are the crucial document. In a world that has grown largely indifferent to the question of endangered species, these works are described by the artists as "a genuine artifact of the event," and are intended to bring home the truth and immediacy of these animals' precarious existence. For there to be an animal-made mark, the animal has to be present, and actively participate. What is performed through its presence is the animal's reality, and what is challenged is precisely that postmodern "loss of faith in our ability to represent the real" (Bertens, *The Idea of the Postmodern*, 11).



Figure 8. Cheetahs with painting: Olly and Suzi with Greg Williams, Namibia, 1998. Photograph copyright Growbag. Reprinted with permission of Liza Samos.

A second example concerning the place the living animal may have in the artist's creativity is drawn from *Monkey Painting*, where Thierry Lenain recounts the "astonishing collaboration" between the French painter Tessarolo and a female chimpanzee named Kunda (Figure 9):

> During the sessions in which they both painted, he left the initiative to Kunda and then completed her clusters of lines by the addition of figurative elements. . . . Tessarolo says that at times, Kunda would accept his additions with enthusiasm, at others she would rub them out and wait for him to draw something else. Once the pictures were finished they were signed by both artists, the painter putting his name on one side and Kunda a handprint on the other. (109)

Lenain specifically describes as "postmodern" this art which, "conceived without irony," aims "to give full recognition to the part played by the animal" (109–11). In works such as those of Olly and Suzi, or of Kunda and Tessarolo, it is the mark of the hand on the painting as point of exchange that, for the present, best records the loose creative alliance of animal and artist. It may not yet be entirely clear what is exchanged between the human and the animal in these instances, but the politics and poetics of that exchange call urgently for further exploration.

Figure 9. The French painter Tessarolo working with Kunda, a chimpanzee. Photograph copyright Jacques Münch. Reprinted with permission of Tessarolo.

Notes

1. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988). Subsequent references are given in the text.

2. Unless otherwise indicated, information about the work of Edwina Ashton, Jordan Baseman, John Isaacs, and Olly and Suzi is drawn from the author's unpublished interviews with these artists, conducted in London between 1998 and 2000. Statements by the artists are also from this source.

3. Brian Luke, "Taming Ourselves or Going Feral?: Toward a Nonpatriarchal Metaethic of Animal Liberation," in *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations,* ed. Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan (Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 1995), 290–91, 313.

4. Beuys is quoted in Caroline Tisdall, *Joseph Beuys: Coyote* (Munich: Schirmer-Mosel, 1980), 28, 26. Subsequent references are given in the text.

5. Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,* trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 184, 194. Subsequent references are given in the text.

6. Jacques Derrida, "*Geschlecht* II: Heidegger's Hand," trans. J. P. Leavey, in *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida,* ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 173. Subsequent references are given in the text.

7. See Steve Baker, *The Postmodern Animal* (London: Reaktion Books, 2000).

8. Will Self, *Great Apes* (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 341–42.

9. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography,* trans. Richard Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 59.

10. Thierry Lenain, *Monkey Painting,* trans. C. Beamish (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 178. Subsequent references are given in the text.

11. Hélène Cixous, "Sorties," in Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, *The Newly Born Woman,* trans. Betsy Wing (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 84.

12. Wegman is quoted in Peter Weiermair, "Photographs: Subversion through the Camera," in *William Wegman: Paintings, Drawings, Photographs, Videotapes,* ed. Martin Kunz (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1990), 46.

13. Rego is quoted in John McEwen, *Paula Rego,* 2d ed. (London: Phaidon Press, 1997), 212.

14. Jacques Derrida, "L'Animal que donc je suis (à suivre)," in *L'Animal autobiographique: Autours de Jacques Derrida,* ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 251–301. Subsequent references are given in the text.

15. Hans Bertens, *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 11. Subsequent references are given in the text.

16. Martin Hentschel, "Passage," in *Passage: Neue Kunst in Hamburg E.V.*, exhibition catalog (Hamburg: Kunsthaus, 1998), 6.

17. Jean-Paul Martinon, "On the Edge of the Abyss," in *Jordan Baseman: Blunt Objects*, exhibition catalog (Graz, Austria: Galerie Eugen Lendl, 1997).